



The effect of environmental cross compliance regulations  
on Swiss farm productivity 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the evolution of Swiss farm productivity during the implementation of 
environmental policy reforms. We employ a production model formulation with technology 
parameters defined as the functions of subsidies, as well as individual farm characteristics. Our 
estimates for two groups of farms – milk-producing and crop farms – show that introducing 
environmental regulations induced serious changes in the production technology and productivity 
of inputs, especially of land, labor and fertilizer. The overall effect of the subsidies on the 
production output has been found negative. At the same time, we find that farms do not use their 
resources optimally, which indicates some deficiencies in structural adjustments, primarily in the 
land and labor markets.  
JEL Classification: Q120, D240. 




Since the early 1990s, the Swiss agricultural sector has been subject to a series of policy reforms. 
Initially, these reforms were primarily caused by increasing public concerns about the ecological 
soundness of farming in Switzerland and were principally aimed at lessening negative 
externalities from agricultural production. Soon thereafter, the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) Uruguay round agreements posed additional challenges to Swiss agricultural policy and 
enforced reforms related to agricultural trade liberalization.  
While there are numerous investigations (Koch, 2002; Götz, 2005; Zgraggen, 2005) which 
have evaluated the impact of reforms on the Swiss farming sector prior to the introduction of a 
particular policy instrument, there are only few empirical studies which analyze the effect of the 
reforms on the economic performance of Swiss farms  (Hofer, 2002; Ferjani, 2005). Yet, 
evaluating the effectiveness and impact of past policy instruments might provide valuable 
insights for their further targeting, as well as the design of new policies. In this context, the 
objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of policy reforms implemented from 1991 to 2006 
on the productivity of Swiss farms. In particular, we seek to answer the following research 
questions: (i) how has the productivity of Swiss farms evolved during the implementation of the 
reforms; (ii) which policy instruments in the series of reforms have had a particularly noticeable 
impact on farm productivity; and (iii) in particular, how has the introduction of ecological cross 
compliance regulations affected farm productivity? 
We employ a production function approach that regards subsidies as an additional facilitating 
input in the production technology. This approach allows us to define the coefficients of the 
production function as functions of subsidies, and thus to consider the impact of subsidies on 
output directly and indirectly, i.e., by affecting input productivity and technological change  
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(Sipiläinen and Kumbhakar, 2007). We further extend this specification by considering the effect 
of several farm-specific factors on farm output.  
In our empirical analysis we employ the unbalanced panel data provided by the Swiss Farm 
Accounting Data Network (FADN) from 1993 to 2006. We estimate the model for two types of 
farms: crop and milk-producing farms in Swiss plain regions. To evaluate the effect of individual 
policy instruments, we distinguish between two policy implementation periods, viz., 1993 to 
1998 and 1999 to 2006, respectively. The first of the aforementioned periods was characterized 
by reductions of output price guarantees and the introduction of decoupled payments, while the 
second period was associated with the abolition of the price support program and introduction of 
ecological cross compliance instruments. Accordingly, the model was estimated for each farm 
group and period under consideration.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we summarize the main goals and 
developments of the Swiss agricultural policy reforms since the early 1990s. Section 2 presents 
the econometric model that allows us to consider the effect of subsidies on production 
technology. We then briefly describe the FADN data employed in the study. Section 4 presents 
and discusses our results and research findings, while Section 5 concludes.  
 
1.  A short overview of the Swiss agricultural policy since 1992 
Switzerland was among the first Western European countries to introduce environmental 
regulations for agricultural production. Since the early 1990s, the Swiss agricultural sector has 
been subject to a series of policy reforms that were influenced by two important developments 
both within and outside the country: on the one hand were growing public concerns about the 
ecological soundness of farming, and on the other hand was the implementation of the WTO 
Uruguay round agreements, which were aimed at agricultural trade liberalization (BLW, 2007).  
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These developments required immediate adjustments in the agricultural support programs and 
obliged the Swiss government to move from the direct subsidization of agricultural output prices 
to a system of environmental cross compliance regulations. Accordingly, the main objectives of 
agricultural policy reforms were:  
-  a steady reduction of price support,  
-  reducing incentives for increasing output supplies,  
-  lessening negative externalities from agricultural production by introducing ecological 
cross compliance regulations, and at the same time,  
-  maintaining farm income support. 
Prior to the reforms (i.e., before 1992) two major farm income support mechanisms were 
available to Swiss farmers: price support and direct payments, including structural improvement 
payments. In the initial reform phase between 1992 and 1998, ecological cross compliance (ECC) 
regulations were introduced on a voluntary basis: all producers retained access to direct 
payments, however, those farms which complied with ecological regulations received additional 
subsidies related to ECC. Since 1999, any kind of direct payments have become contingent upon 
compliance with ecological regulations. Furthermore, the government set up a stronger 
differentiation of subsidies starting in 1999. This was done to increase incentives to comply with 
individual ECC regulations, and also to ease monitoring.  
Since 1992 the direct payment system has consisted of general direct payments and ecological 
direct payments, each of which have different sub-categories (DZV, 1998). General direct 
payments provide compensation for basic farming tasks as set out in the Swiss constitution: in 
particular for ensuring food supplies, maintaining landscapes and assisting in the preservation of 
infrastructure in rural areas. The amount of these payments depends on the farm’s size, which is a 
combination of farm land and the number of grazing animals. In upland and mountainous areas,  
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additional payments reimburse farmers for production under unfavorable conditions. Since 1999, 
general direct payments are contingent on the following basic ECC regulations
1: maintaining a 
certain limit of ecological compensation areas, an even nutrient balance, regular crop rotation, 
limited and regulated soil protection and the targeted use of plant treatment products, as well as 
precise prescriptions regarding animal treatment and breeding. Ecological direct payments 
compensate farmers who participate in voluntary programs such as organic farming, animal 
welfare, the ecological compensation area program, preserving biodiversity, etc. (DZV, 1998). 
Though price support has been steadily reduced, the total amount of governmental support 
increased substantially immediately after the introduction of the reforms, i.e., from 1992 to 1997, 
and stayed rather constant after 1998 (Joerin, 2007). In 2006, Swiss farms received direct 
payments in the total amount of ca 2.5 bn. Swiss Francs. Currently, a larger part of direct 
payments – approximately 80 percent – has been provided in the form of general direct payments. 
The remaining 20 percent corresponds with different types of ecological direct payments.  
 
2.  Econometric model  
The production technology used to produce an aggregate output y  is described by a 
production function y = f(x), where x is a vector of production inputs. Farmers also receive direct 
payments
2 that are decoupled from production. If we assume that a subsidy S directly affects 
output as an ordinary input and technological change captured in the time trend variable t, the 
production technology can be defined as follows (Sipiläinen and Kumbhakar, 2007): 
) , , ( t S x f y   .  (1) 
                                                 
1 called der Ökologischer Leistungsnachweis (ÖLN) in German. 
2 Direct payments are separated from the farms’ output.  
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However, a subsidy may affect the production output directly as well as indirectly, i.e., by 
influencing input use as well as inducing technological adjustments. This requires a more general 
formulation of the production technology in (1), i.e.: 
  ) ( , ), ( S t S S x f y   .  (2) 
Further, by assuming that the production technology is described by a Cobb-Douglas 
function, we can rewrite (2) as:  
0 ln ln( ) ( )ln ( ) kk j j t yS S x S t           (3) 
where 
   k jk j j S S ln ) (     (4) 
    k tk tt t t S t S ln 5 . 0 ) (      ,  (5) 
 ε is the stochastic noise term, jєJ is the index of the input type, kєK is the index of the subsidy 
type, and finally, ) (S j  and ) (S t  are the input use and technology coefficients, respectively 
(Sipiläinen and Kumbhakar, 2007). To capture the effect of subsidies on input use and 
technological change,  ) (S j  and ) (S t  are specified as the functions of subsidies.  If we write 
00 () l n ( ) kk SS     in (3) then all the parameters of the production function are affected by 
S from which some special cases can be derived and empirically tested. 
Since  ) (S j   represent output elasticities of respective production inputs, their values have to 
be non-negative. To impose this non-negativity restriction we employ the following re-
parameterization of (4):  
     k jk j j S S ln exp ) (    . (6) 
Substituting (5) and (6) into (3), we then obtain:    
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The econometric model in (7) can be further extended by considering the effect of farm 
characteristics such as a farm manager’s age, education, experience, farm location, etc. Similar to 
subsidies, these traits might affect the technology parameters. Accordingly, considering the effect 
of different farm characteristics,  l F  , we extend (7) to the following specification:  
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From (8), the output elasticity of the subsidy type k can be obtained by taking the first 
derivative with respect to the respective type of the subsidy, i.e.:  
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The expression in (9) shows that the effect of subsidies comprises three components: first, a 
direct subsidy effect; second, an input-specific component; and, third, a technology component.  
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which shows that the rate of technological change consists of neutral technological change, a 
component affected by individual subsidies and also a farm-specific component.    
The output elasticities with regard to single inputs also incorporate the effect of subsidies and 
farm specifics, that is:  
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Since the marginal product incorporates the elasticity of the respective input, it is also 
influenced by subsidies and farm idiosyncrasies. The second component of the marginal product 
is the respective partial input productivity. These marginal products can then be compared to the 
respective input prices to analyze whether inputs are over (under) used and whether regulatory 
measures were helpful in using the inputs optimally. 
 
3.  Data 
We employ an unbalanced panel data set provided by the Swiss FADN from 1993 to 2006. 
We distinguish between two groups of farms, (milk-producing and crop farms in Swiss plain 
regions) and two policy implementation periods (from 1993 to 1998 and 1999 to 2006), i.e., 
before and after coupling direct payments to compliance with environmental standards (ÖLN). 
As the introduction of cross compliance regulations was expected to have a serious impact on the 
farms’ production technology, to obtain consistent technology parameter estimates we estimate 
the model for the two periods separately
3. 
The following three criteria are used to include a farm in the sample: (i) farm crop acreage ≥ 
10 ha; (ii) no special crops such as grapes, vegetables etc; (iii) the share of non-agricultural 
income in farm revenue < 0.40. The number of annual observations (on average) fulfilling these 
criteria in the first period are 198 and 106 for milk and crop farms, respectively. For the second 
period, the average number of farm observations was reduced to 106 and 30, respectively.  
                                                 
3 In addition, since 1999 Swiss farms have become eligible to trade milk quotas. This development could induce 
serious changes in Swiss milk farm production. Accordingly, the estimation of the model for the whole period from 
1993 to 2006 could produce biased estimates.  
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The average size of milk-producing farms is 26 ha of crop land and 30 cows. Crop farms have 27 
ha of crop land on average. We use the Swiss equivalent for the farm’s revenue from 
agricultural production (so called Rohertrag) as the measure of output. For both groups of 
farms we distinguished between 5 inputs: crop land, capital (measured by machine and 
buildings’ depreciation value), labor (man-years of farm and hired labor in agricultural 
production), fertilizer (cost of mineral fertilizer), and materials (cost of intermediate inputs). 
For milk farms we consider an additional input, i.e., cows (measured as the number of 
standardized animal-units). Since most of the output and input variables provided by FADN 
are monetary values, we adjust the output and relevant input variables by their respective 
price indices as provided by the Swiss Federal Department of Agriculture (BLW, 2000-2007) 
and the Swiss Farmers’ Association (SBV, 2008).  
Furthermore, we aggregate different types of subsidies into the following three categories
4: 
-  general direct payments without ECC, which were available before 1999
5 (dp),   
-  general direct payments with ECC (dp_ecc),   
-  ecological direct payments (dp_eco).  
The list of farm-specific characteristics includes the farmer’s age and education, the share of 
land rented, the share of agricultural income of total farm income, the share of hired labor, the 
altitude (above sea level) of the farmland and the animal density (the number of animals per ha of 
land).  
 
4.  Results 
                                                 
4 The model was initially estimated considering a stronger differentiation of ecological direct payments. However, 
the majority of the parameter estimates were not significant. Thus, we aggregated them into one variable dp_eco. 
5 Accordingly, this type of subsidy was not considered in the model estimates for the 1999-2006 period.  
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Table 1 presents the model’s parameter estimates for two selected groups of farms, i.e., milk 
farms and crop farms, and two reforms’ sub-periods: before and since 1999 (1993-1998 and 
1999-2006), respectively
6. We began our analysis by examining the direct effect of subsidies on 
the farms’ output. According to our estimates, the direct effect of the general subsidies on the 
crop farms’ output was significantly negative in both periods, i.e., from 1993 to 1998 and from 
1999 to 2006. For the milk farms, this impact was significant in the period from 1993 to 1998 
only. In contrast to the crop farms, the direct effect of the ECC payments on output was positive 
for the milk farms that adopted the ECC regulations. At the same time, ecological direct 
payments – considered in both an aggregated and disaggregated form – were not found to 
significantly affect the output in both groups of farms.  
Furthermore, our estimates suggest an indirect effect of subsidies on the farms’ production 
output. In particular, direct payments seem to have a positive impact on technical change in both 
farm groups. This impact was, however, more pronounced in the first phase of the reforms. In 
fact, in this period farms were actively searching for practices which could compensate 
production output losses caused by the introduction of ECC. In particular, to increase the 
productivity of plants and animals, farms relied more strongly on improved genetic selection. 
Through improved fertilization timing, farms sought an increased effectiveness of fertilizer 
utilization. 
Please place Table 1 here. 
A similar tendency is observed regarding the impact of direct payments on input productivity: 
it was more distinct in the first phase of the reforms. The impact of direct payments was 
especially pronounced in the crop farms with respect to labor: the coefficient estimates for all 
three considered subsidy categories are highly significant with regard to this input. According to 
                                                 
6 To ensure efficient estimates, we reduced the respective model specifications by the variables with insignificant 
parameter estimates.  
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our estimates, direct payments without ECC negatively affected labor productivity, whereas the 
ECC direct payments had a positive impact on the productivity of labor in crop farms prior to 
1999. This suggests that in general, the shift from price support to the system of direct payments 
caused a reduction in labor productivity. Yet, it seems that the adoption of ecological cross 
compliance regulations alleviated this negative effect to some extent. The latter is most likely 
related to technological adjustments such as a more reasonable fertilization timing, which can be 
a prerequisite for higher labor input during short spans, but can concurrently allow an increase in 
its productivity. Ecological direct payments were revealed to affect labor productivity negatively. 
This result is in line with empirical evidence: organic farming is associated with more extensive 
labor use compared to conventional production practices.  
The effect of ECC direct payments on labor productivity was different in the milk farms: they 
influenced labor productivity negatively after 1998. This finding is consistent with the processes 
observed in Swiss agriculture: new regulations on animal breeding treatment have induced more 
extensive labor use in livestock farms.       
While the effect of general direct payments without cross compliance was found to be not 
significant, the direct payments with ECC negatively affected the elasticity of land in the crop 
farms. This has to be caused by regulations prescribing the maintenance of ecological 
compensation areas and the limited use of nitrogen and other fertilizers. In fact, to comply with 
environmental regulations, farms had to establish ecological compensation areas; that caused a 
reduction of the farms’ productive acreage by 7 percent.  
In the milk farms, land productivity was negatively influenced by the direct payments without 
ECC. This is most likely because between 1993 and 1998, the direct payments without ECC were 
attainable by the farms with an animal density less than 3 standard animal units per hectare. To 
maintain direct payments, livestock farms with a higher animal density had to reduce their animal  
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stock, which obviously reduced the productivity of their land. Milk farms with a lower intensity 
of animal breeding instead benefitted from ECC reforms; as they were able to introduce the 
necessary adjustments relatively easily, they adopted the ECC reforms first. In line with this 
empirical evidence, we have found a positive effect of direct payments on land productivity in the 
farms that introduced ECC. It even seems that there were many milk farms that had the potential 
to improve their productivity and still comply with environmental regulations. This potential first 
became evident after the introduction of reforms, when – due to the scarcity of arable land – the 
land markets became more competitive. Furthermore, we found a tendency for reducing the 
productivity of intermediate inputs that is most likely associated with a reducing scale of the 
production and restrictions on the use of particular plant treatment agents (i.e., after the ECC 
adoption, farms were obliged to use a narrow selection of plant protection agents that probably 
reduced the effectiveness of plant protection).  
Table 2 summarizes the effect of direct payments. These results indicate that the effect of the 
direct payments without ECC was rather comparable in both farm groups, while the ECC direct 
payments influenced the productivity of the milk and crop farms rather differently: the ECC 
payments increased the output of the milk farms by approx. 3 percent on average during the 
period from 1993 to 1998, while their effect was negative (- 0.4 percent on average) in the crop 
farms after 1999.
7 The opposite development was found with respect to the effect of the ECC 
direct payments on input productivity. In particular, while in the milk farms the direct payments 
with ECC caused a reduction in total input productivity (by 2.72 and 0.33 percent on average, 
before and after 1998), they induced crop farms to increase the productivity of input use by 0.5 
percent. The ecological direct payments were not found to have any statistically significant 
                                                 
7 This development can be also related to the fact that Swiss milk producers were eligible to increase their milk 
contingents from 1997 to 1999.  
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influence on the milk farms’ output, yet before 1999 they had a tendency to considerably reduce 
the input productivity (i.e., labor) of the crop farms that participated in ecological programs. 
Furthermore, before 1999, the total effect of subsidies on technical change was substantial in 
both groups of farms. This effect was mainly caused by the direct payments without ECC. 
Though no serious influence of the ECC direct payments on technical change was found for the 
crop farms, they had a slight but positive effect on the technological level of the milk farming in 
the later period of reforms.  
The total effect of the direct payments on the farms’ output was negative in both groups of 
farms during the whole period of reforms. Yet this effect actually decreased during the reforms. 
Additionally, as our results suggest, the effect of direct payments was more pronounced in the 
crop farms. Indeed, in the 1993-1998 period, the crop farms reduced their output by -2.33 percent 
on average annually, while in the milk farms, production was decreasing by only -0.52 percent.  
Please place Table 2 here. 
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the trends for returns to scale in the milk and crop farms, 
respectively. The areas dashed differently correspond to the individual input elasticities. The 
comparison of both figures demonstrates clearly that the crop farms had to undertake more 
serious adjustments in technology during the reform period. These adjustments caused a 
substantial reduction of returns to scale in the crop farms, i.e., from 1.13 in 1993 to 0.98 in 2006. 
This development can be explained primarily by reducing the output elasticities of quasi-fixed 
inputs, i.e., land, capital and labor. In the milk farms, returns to scale didn’t change considerably, 
although they had a tendency to approach constant returns to scale. While labor elasticity was 
decreasing in these farms as well, land elasticity has doubled here. Currently, the production in 
both groups of farms seems to exhibit decreasing returns to scale, i.e., a proportional increase in  
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all inputs causes a less than proportional increase in the production output, which suggests a 
suboptimal scale of production in Swiss farms.
8 
Please place Figures 1 and 2 here. 
Finally, we analyze the optimality of input use in Swiss farms. Figure 3 presents the marginal 
products and the respective input-output price ratios
9 for the six considered production factors. 
Regarding quasi-fixed inputs, both groups of farms underuse land
10, but overuse labor and 
capital.
11 This result suggests that a sub-optimal scale of production in Swiss farms is caused by a 
disproportionate use of labor and capital.  
At the beginning of reforms, there were considerable differences in the marginal products of 
land in crop and milk farms, whereas in the course of reforms, these differences almost 
disappeared (for both groups of farms, the respective marginal product ranged between 16,000 
and 18,000 CHF between 2004-2006). The marginal products of labor also seem to be quite 
similar between the considered farms’ groups. Yet, regarding capital, the marginal product was 
found to be substantially lower in the crop farms compared to the milk farms. This finding 
indicates that crop farms seem to have much more abundant capital than milk farms.  
Please place Figure 3 here. 
The marginal product of keeping milk cows was increasing during reforms (Figure 3d); this 
finding is in line with the previously presented results, suggesting an increase in milk 
productivity due to improved genetic selection. Despite this fact, milk farms tend to keep a less 
than optimal number of cows. This is most probably related to the ECC boundary on animal 
                                                 
8 That is, the farms seem to overuse resources. 
9 Since farm output is a monetary variable, the price ratios between inputs and the output is equal to the price of a 
respective input. 
10 Land rent prices are regulated in Switzerland. Thus, it can happen that the rent price of land does not reflect its real 
value. 
11 If the farms would have maximized profit, then the marginal product would have been equal to the price ratios of 
inputs and output.  
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density. A similar tendency was revealed concerning fertilizer:  Figure 3e demonstrates that their 
marginal productivity increased considerably in the course of reforms, especially concerning crop 
farms. This result is in line with empirical evidence: in view of ECC regulations, Swiss farms 
have to apply fertilizer at a level lower than the optimal one considering relative prices at present. 
The same is observable with regard to intermediate inputs.  Since under ECC, farms are subject 
to very restrictive regulations primarily considering fertilizer application and plant protection, 
they have rather limited options for optimizing variable input use. Yet our results suggest that 
Swiss farms might considerably improve their economic situation by reducing sub-optimality in 
the quasi-fixed input use.  
Finally, a farm’s individual characteristics also seem to be a significant determinant of Swiss 
farm productivity. Land productivity tends to be higher in farms that own a considerable part of 
the farm land and which generate a larger share of their income from agriculture. Land ownership 
also seems to influence the productivity of the milk farms. Here, they have a significant effect on 
the speed of technical change. Educational background is decisive for improving labor 
productivity in the crop farms. It also significantly influences the productivity of cows in milk 
farms.      
 
5.  Conclusions  
The paper analyzes the evolution of Swiss farm productivity in the course of reforms 
implemented since 1992. The analysis is done by employing an econometric approach that allows 
us to model the effect of subsidies on production technology. The model was estimated for two 
groups of farms: milk and crop farms from the Swiss plain regions for two sub-periods. 
Our results indicate that the adoption of environmental cross compliance has induced serious 
changes in production technology. This development was particularly distinctive in Swiss crop  
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farms and suggests that environmental regulations were more restrictive for crop production. 
Further, we found a different effect of regulations on the productivity of single inputs in milk and 
crop farms, which presumably was caused not only by differences in technology, but also in the 
input use intensity prior to reforms in these two groups of farms.  
Moreover, our analysis also shows that most technological adjustments were undertaken 
before 1999, i.e., before direct payments were contingent on ECC. This finding suggests that 
Swiss farms have adequate monetary incentives to comply with ecological regulations. We also 
found an indication for a positive effect of reforms on technical change: under environmental 
regulations, farms began to look for technological options for maintaining high productivity of 
input use not by increasing input intensity, but rather the effectiveness of input utilization.  
Furthermore, we found a negative total effect of direct payments on farm production output. 
This indicates that the policy has sent the right signals to Swiss farmers. However, further 
research is required to analyze whether policy objectives could be achieved by spending a lower 
amount of public funds. Another positive effect of reforms is that they reduced the discrepancies 
in marginal land rents, which suggests a more productive use of this input across different farm 
types.  
However, our analysis revealed considerable sub-optimalities with regard to almost all farm 
resources. Though farms might have very limited options for optimizing variable input use (this 
particularly concerns fertilizer and crop protection application), under environmental cross-
compliance regulations, Swiss farms have substantial reserves to improve their economic 
situation by adjusting their allocation of quasi-fixed inputs. This, however, presupposes the 
development of proper institutional and political conditions for further structural adjustments in 
Swiss rural areas. Finally, we found only scarce empirical evidence suggesting the effect of 
ecological direct payments on farms’ production. This might be an indication of low  
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effectiveness of the support programs in this field. Considering this, there is apparently a 
potential for further targeting single cross compliance instruments in Swiss farming.   
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a) cow prices were adjusted considering the annual rotation rate of 0.29 (LBL, srva and FIBL, 
2003). 
Figure 3  
Marginal productivity of land (3a), labor (3b), capital (3c), cows (3d), fertilizer (3e) and 





Table 1  Coefficient estimates for two farm groups and two periods  
 
b0 5.69 *** 5.34 *** 4.61 *** 4.90 ***
by_dp  --  -- -0.02 **  --
by_dp_ecc 0.03 **  --  -- -0.004 ***
at -0.06 *** 0.09 *** -0.03 * 0.05 ***
att 0.02 *** -0.002 ** 0.01 * -0.01 **
at_dp 0.001 **  -- 0.002 **  --
at_dp_ecc  -- 0.0003 *  --  --
a_land -1.95 *** -1.65 *** -0.81 *** -1.42 ***
a_labor -2.66 *** -1.17 *** 0.15 -3.96 ***
a_capital -2.48 *** -2.62 *** -3.23 *** -4.60 ***
a_fert -1.98 *** -2.10 *** -2.88 *** -1.85 ***
a_interm -8.05 *** -3.37 *** -0.77 *** -0.84 ***
a_interm_euz 0.07 ***  -- -0.55 *** 0.40 ***
a_cows -0.87 *** -0.92 ***  --  --
a_land_dp -0.04 ***  --  --  --
a_land_dp_ecc 0.03 ***  -- -0.01 ***  --
a_labor_dp 0.02 ***  -- -0.11 ***  --
a_labor_dp_ecc  -- -0.03 *** 0.05 ***  --
a_labor_dp_eco  --  -- -0.09 ***  --
a_capital_dp  --  -- 0.02 ***  --
a_interm_dp  --  -- -0.003 **  --
a_interm_dp_ecc -0.01 *** -0.004 * 0.003 ***  --
at_age  -- -0.02 ***  --  --
at_lrent  -- -0.05 ***  --  --
at_lrent2  -- 0.03 ***  --  --
a_land_aginc 0.002 *** 0.002 ***  --  --
a_land_lrent  --  -- -0.25 ***  --
a_land_lrent2  --  -- 0.24 ***  --
a_labor_educ  --  --  -- 0.46 ***
a_labor_altit 0.001 ***  --  --  --
a_labor_whire  --  -- -0.02 ***  --
a_labor_adense  --  -- -0.75 **  --
a_capital_aginc  --  --  -- 0.01 *
a_capital_adense  --  -- 0.34 ***  --
a_fert_whire  --  -- 0.01 ***  --
a_interm_aginc  --  -- 0.0002 **  --
a_cows_educ 0.066 * 0.07 **  --  --
R
2 0.81 0.87 0.85 0.85
Coefficient
milk farms crop farms




Table 2  Output elasticity of direct payments  
1993-1998 1999-2006 1993-1998 1999-2006
DP without ECC
output  --  -- -1.75  --
input -1.13  -- -0.78  --
technical change 0.31  -- 0.36  --
DP with ECC
output 3.03  --  -- -0.40
input -2.72 -0.33 0.49  --
technical change  -- 0.09  --  --
ecological DP
input  --  -- -0.65  --
total -0.52 -0.24 -2.33 -0.40















Summary statistics   
Variable Abbreviation
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Milk farms 
Output, CHF output 166723 56302 66098 443933 195353 70874 68147 546160
Land, ha l a n d 2 8 91 38 3 2 91 01 47 1
Labor, man-years labor 2.0 0.6 0.8 4.6 1.9 0.6 0.8 4.3
Capital, CHF capital 38723 16428 5373 124972 36265 16338 2395 108523
Fertilizer, CHF fert 8135 4368 912 34720 6932 3440 1053 25202
Intermediate inputs, CHF  interm 47681 22227 13091 189733 61678 31934 14532 245120
Cows cows 30 11 8 94 31 12 8 98
Direct payments without ECC dp 20530 6233 0 58696  --  --  --  --
Direct payments with ECC dp_ecc 11436 9232 0 39063 40885 14616 0 100296
Ecological direct payments dp_eco 4510 4368 0 36396 9166 5584 0 34874
Share of rented land l_rent 0.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 1.0
Share of agricultural income in 
total farm income aginc 0.9 0.3 -3.2 6.9 0.8 0.5 -1.3 1.7
Age a g e 4 41 02 37 2 4 5 92 46 7
Educational level e d u c 5127 4108
Altitutude, meters altit 519 96 260 804 517 89 312 864
Share of hired labor w _ h i r e 0 . 30 . 20 . 00 . 9 0 . 30 . 20 . 01 . 0
Animal density a d e n s e 1 . 10 . 30 . 43 . 0 1 . 10 . 30 . 33 . 3
Crop farms 
Output, CHF output 158932 56986 39146 400068 184239 68598 42361 416261
Land, ha land 25 9 13 83 26 9 13 71
Labor, man-years labor 2.0 0.6 0.8 4.1 1.8 0.6 0.7 4.2
Capital, CHF capital 34785 15642 5975 123765 34318 16264 2914 107100
Fertilizer, CHF fert 9757 5629 2005 46524 8957 4763 2491 28209
Intermediate inputs, CHF  interm 43898 19226 7984 144546 50533 23649 14244 202673
Direct payments without ECC dp 17605 6573 5924 64148  --  --  --  --
Direct payments with ECC dp_ecc 10665 9586 0 44676 37104 14598 0 100296
Ecological direct payments dp_eco 3051 3163 0 19890 5202 3543 0 33081
Share of rented land l_rent 0.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 1.0
Share of agricultural income in 
total farm income aginc 0.8 0.3 -2.4 1.7 0.8 0.2 -1.9 1.1
Age a g e 4 41 02 47 0 4 51 02 46 9
Educational level e d u c 5108 5117
Altitutude, meters altit 490 85 300 804 474 69 315 760
Share of hired labor w _ h i r e 0 . 3 0 . 2 0 . 0 0 . 8 0001
Animal density a d e n s e 0 . 80 . 30 . 01 . 7 0 . 70 . 20 . 01 . 3
1993-1998 1999-2006
 